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Abstract
Despite the remarkable performance of deep neu-
ral networks on various computer vision tasks,
they are known to be susceptible to adversarial
perturbations, which makes it challenging to de-
ploy them in real-world safety-critical applica-
tions. In this paper, we conjecture that the leading
cause of adversarial vulnerability is the distortion
in the latent feature space, and provide methods
to suppress them effectively. Explicitly, we de-
fine vulnerability for each latent feature and then
propose a new loss for adversarial learning, Vul-
nerability Suppression (VS) loss, that aims to min-
imize the feature-level vulnerability during train-
ing. We further propose a Bayesian framework to
prune features with high vulnerability to reduce
both vulnerability and loss on adversarial samples.
We validate our Adversarial Neural Pruning with
Vulnerability Suppression (ANP-VS) method on
multiple benchmark datasets, on which it not only
obtains state-of-the-art adversarial robustness but
also improves the performance on clean examples,
using only a fraction of the parameters used by the
full network. Further qualitative analysis suggests
that the improvements come from the suppression
of feature-level vulnerability.
1. Introduction
In the last many years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have
achieved impressive results on various computer vision
tasks, e.g., image classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012),
face/object recognition (He et al., 2015; Deng et al., 2019),
and semantic segmentation (He et al., 2017). The ground-
breaking success of DNNs has motivated their use in safety-
critical environments such as medical imaging (Esteva et al.,
2017) and autonomous driving (Bojarski et al., 2016). How-
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ever, DNNs are extremely brittle to carefully crafted imper-
ceptible adversarial perturbations intentionally optimized
to cause miss-prediction (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow
et al., 2014).
While the field has primarily focused on the development
of new attacks and defenses, a ‘cat-and-mouse’ game be-
tween attacker and defender has arisen. There has been
a long list of proposed defenses to mitigate the effect of
adversarial examples, e.g., defenses (Papernot et al., 2016;
Xu et al., 2017b; Buckman et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2018),
followed by successful attacks (Carlini & Wagner, 2016;
Athalye et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018). This shows that
any defense mechanism that once looks successful could
be circumvented with the invention of new attacks. In this
paper, we tackle the problem by identifying a more funda-
mental cause of the adversarial vulnerability of DNNs.
What makes DNNs vulnerable to adversarial attacks? Our in-
tuition is that the adversarial vulnerability of a DNN comes
from the distortion in the latent feature space incurred by the
adversarial perturbation. If a perturbation at the input level
is suppressed successfully at any layers of the DNN, then it
would not cause miss-prediction. However, not all latent fea-
tures will contribute equally to the distortion; some features
may have more substantial distortion, by amplifying the
perturbations at the input level, while others will remain rel-
atively static. Under this motivation, we first formally define
the vulnerability of the latent features and show that sparse
networks can have a much smaller degree of network-level
vulnerability in Figure 2(a). Then, we propose an effective
way to suppress vulnerability by pruning the latent features
with high vulnerability. We refer to this defense mechanism
as Adversarial Neural Pruning (ANP). Further, we propose
a novel loss, which we refer to as Vulnerability Suppression
(VS) loss, that directly suppresses the vulnerability in the
feature space by minimizing the feature-level vulnerability.
To this end, we propose a novel defense mechanism coined,
Adversarial Neural Pruning with Vulnerability Suppression
(ANP-VS), that learns pruning masks for the features in a
Bayesian framework to minimize both the adversarial loss
and the feature-level vulnerability, as illustrated in Figure 1.
It effectively suppresses the distortion in the latent feature
space with almost no extra cost relative to adversarial train-
ing and yields light-weighted networks that are more robust
to adversarial perturbations.
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Figure 1. Concept: We hypothesize that the distortion in the latent
feature space is the leading cause of the adversarial vulnerability
of deep neural networks and introduce a novel Vulnerability Sup-
pression (VS) loss that explicitly aims to minimize feature-level
distortions. Further, we prune the features with significant distor-
tions by learning pruning masks with Adversarial Neural Pruning
(ANP) that minimizes the adversarial loss.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We hypothesize that the distortion in the latent features
is the leading cause of DNN’s susceptibility to adver-
sarial attacks and formally describe the concepts of the
vulnerability of latent-features based on the expecta-
tion of the distortion of latent-features with respect to
input perturbations.
• Based on this finding, we introduce a novel defense
mechanism, Adversarial Neural Pruning with Vulner-
ability Suppression (ANP-VS), to mitigate the feature-
level vulnerability. The resulting framework learns a
Bayesian pruning (dropout) mask to prune out the vul-
nerable features while preserving the robust ones by
minimizing the adversarial and Vulnerability Suppres-
sion (VS) loss.
• We experimentally validate our proposed method on
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 datasets, on
which it achieves state-of-the-art robustness with a sub-
stantial reduction in memory and computation, with
qualitative analysis which suggests that the improve-
ment on robustness comes from its suppression of
feature-level vulnerability.
While our primary focus is on improving the robustness
of DNNs, we also found that ANP-VS achieves higher ac-
curacy for clean/non-adversarial inputs, compared to base-
line adversarial training methods (see the results of CIFAR
datasets in Table 1). This is another essential benefit of
ANP-VS as it has been well known that adversarial train-
ing tends to hurt the clean accuracy (Schmidt et al., 2018;
Tsipras et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019).
2. Related work
Adversarial robustness. Since the literature on the adver-
sarial robustness of neural networks is vast, we only discuss
some of the most relevant studies. A large number of de-
fenses (Papernot et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017a; Buckman
et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018) have
been proposed and consequently broken by more sophis-
ticated attack methods (Carlini & Wagner, 2016; Athalye
et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018). Adversarial training based
defenses (Madry et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2019; Hendrycks
et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019) are widely considered to
be the most effective since they largely avoid the obfus-
cated gradients problem (Athalye et al., 2018). There has
also been previous work that studied robust and vulnerable
features at the input level. Garg et al. (2018) established a
relation between adversarially robust features and the spec-
tral property of the geometry of the dataset and Gao et al.
(2017) proposed to remove unnecessary features to get ro-
bustness. Recently, Ilyas et al. (2019) disentangle robust and
non-robust features in the input-space. Our work is different
from these existing works in that we consider and define
the vulnerability at the latent feature level, which is more
directly related to the model prediction.
Sparsification methods. Sparsification of neural net-
works is becoming increasingly important with the increased
deployments of deep network models to resource-limited de-
vices. The most straightforward way to sparsify neural net-
works is by removing weights with small magnitude (Strm,
1997; Collins & Kohli, 2014); however, such heuristics-
based pruning often degenerates accuracy, and Han et al.
(2015) proposed an iterative retraining and pruning approach
to recover from the damage from pruning. Using sparsity-
inducing regularization (e.g. `1) is another popular ap-
proach for network sparsification. However elementwise
sparsity does not yield practical speed-ups and Wen et al.
(2016) proposed to use group sparsity to drop a neuron
or a filter as a whole, that will reduce the actual network
size. Molchanov et al. (2017) proposed to learn the individ-
ual dropout rates per weight with sparsity-inducing priors
to completely drop out unnecessary weights, and Neklyu-
dov et al. (2017) proposed to exploit structured sparsity by
learning masks for each neuron or filter. Lee et al. (2018)
proposed a variational dropout whose dropout probabili-
ties are drawn from sparsity-inducing beta-Bernoulli prior.
Information-theoretic approaches have been also shown to
be effective, such as Dai et al. (2018) which minimizes
the information theoretic bound to reduce the redundancy
between layers.
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Figure 2. (a) Mean distortion (average perturbation in latent features across all layers) for MNIST on Lenet-5-Caffe, CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 on VGG-16. Our method yields a network with minimum vulnerability (distortion) compared to all the other networks;
we provide the formal definition of vulnerability in Section 3. Visualization of the vulnerability for the input layer for Lenet-5-Caffe
on MNIST for various methods where the vulnerability of the input layer is reported in the bracket (the smaller is, the better): (b)
Standard trained model, (c) Standard Bayesian pruning, (d) Adversarial trained network and (e) ANP-VS. The standard network (a) has
the maximum distortion, which is comparatively reduced in adversarial training (d) and further suppressed by ANP-VS (e).
Robustness and sparsity. The sparsity and robustness
have been explored together in various recent works. Guo
et al. (2018) analyzes sparsity and robustness from a theo-
retical and experimental perspective and demonstrate that
appropriately higher sparsity leads to a more robust model
and Ye et al. (2018) experimentally discuss how pruning
shall effect robustness with a similar conclusion. In con-
trary, Wang et al. (2018) derived opposite conclusions show-
ing that robustness decreases with increase in sparsity. Ye
& Xu (2019) proposed concurrent adversarial training and
weight pruning to enable model compression while pre-
serving robustness. However, ANP-VS is fundamentally
different from all these methods; we sparsify networks while
explicitly learning the pruning (dropout) mask to minimize
the loss on adversarial examples.
3. Robustness of deep representations
We first briefly introduce some notations and the concept of
vulnerability in the deep latent representation space. We rep-
resent a L-layer neural network by a function f : X → Y
with dataset denoted by D = {X,Y }. Specifically, we
denote any sample instance by x ∈ X , and it’s corre-
sponding label by y. The output vector fθ(x) can then be
represented by fθ(x) = fL−1(fL−2(· · · (f1(x)))) where,
θ = {W1, . . . ,WL−1, b1, . . . , bL−1}.
Let zl denote the latent-feature vector for the l-th layer with
rectified linear unit (ReLU) as the activation function, then
fl(·) can be defined as:
zl+1 = fl(zl) = max{Wlzl + bl, 0}, ∀l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L− 2}
whereWl and bl denote the weight and bias vector respec-
tively. Let x and x˜ denote clean and adversarial data points,
respectively (x˜ = x + δ) for any x ∈ X with `p-ball
B(x, ε) around x : {x˜ ∈ X : ‖x˜− x‖ ≤ ε}, zl and z˜l as
their corresponding latent-feature map vectors for the l-th
layer of the network.
Vulnerability of a latent-feature. The vulnerability of a
k-th latent-feature for l-th layer can be measured by the
distortion in that feature in the presence of an adversary.
The vulnerability of a latent feature could then be defined
as the expectation of the Manhattan distance between the
feature value for a clean example (zlk) and its adversarial
example (z˜lk). This could be formally defined as follows:
v(zlk, z˜lk) = E(x,y)∼D||zlk − z˜lk|| (1)
Vulnerability of a network. We can measure the vulner-
ability of an entire network fθ(X) by computing the sum
of the vulnerability of all the latent features vectors of the
network before the logit layer, then V(fθ(X), fθ(X˜)) can
be defined as:
vl =
1
Nl
k=Nl∑
k=1
v(zlk, z˜lk),
V(fθ(X), fθ(X˜)) =
1
L− 2
l=L−2∑
l=1
vl
(2)
where vl represents the vulnerability of the layer l composed
of Nl latent-features. Figure 2(a) shows the vulnerability
of different networks across various datasets. It can be
observed that although adversarial training suppresses the
vulnerability at the input level, the latent feature space is still
vulnerable to adversarial perturbation and that our proposed
method achieves the minimum distortion.
Adversarial training. Adversarial Training (Goodfellow
et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016) was proposed as a data
augmentation method to train the network on the mixture of
clean and adversarial examples until the loss converges.
Madry et al. (2018) incorporated the adversarial search
inside the training process by solving the following non-
convex outer minimization problem and a non-concave inner
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maximization problem:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈B(x,ε)
L(θ, x˜,y)
]
(3)
Figure 2 shows that adversarial training can distinguish
between robust and vulnerable features. While the standard
training results in obtaining vulnerable features, adversarial
training reduces the vulnerability of the latent-features and
selects the robust features which are necessarily required to
attain adversarial robustness.
Relationship between robustness and sparsity. Guo
et al. (2018); Ye et al. (2018) shows that sparsifying net-
works leads to more robust networks, which is evident by
our definitions: sparsity suppresses vulnerability to 0 and
thus reduces the network vulnerability. Ye & Xu (2019)
uses a pre-trained adversarial defense model and investi-
gated different pruning schemes for robustness. However,
the network still does not take into account the robustness
of a latent-feature. To address these limitations, we intro-
duce ANP-VS in the next section, which is a novel method
to prune and suppress these vulnerable features and only
requires a standard network. In the experiments section, we
show that our method significantly outperforms their method
in adversarial robustness and computational efficiency.
4. Adversarial neural pruning with
vulnerability suppression
In this section, we propose our method to reduce the vulner-
ability in the latent space. Let L(θ M ,x,y) be the loss
function at data point x with class y for any x ∈X for the
model with parameters θ and mask parametersM , we use
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018) to
generate the adversarial examples:
x˜k+1 =
∏
B(x,ε)
(x˜k + α · sgn(OxL(θ M , x˜k,y))) (4)
where α is the step size, sgn(·) returns the sign of the vector,
 is the hadamard product,∏(·) is the projection operator
on `∞ norm-ball B(x, ε) around x with radius ε for each
example, and xk+1 denotes the adversarial example at the
k-th PGD step. Specifically, PGD perturbs the clean exam-
ple x for K number of steps, and projects the adversarial
example x˜k+1 onto the norm-ball of x, if it goes beyond
B(x, ε) after each step of perturbation.
In order to minimize the vulnerability of the network, we
first propose Adversarial Neural Pruning (ANP). The basic
idea of ANP is to achieve robustness while suppressing the
distortion, by explicitly pruning out the latent features with
high distortion. Specifically, ANP learns pruning masks
for the features in a Bayesian framework to minimize the
Algorithm 1 Adversarial training by ANP-VS
input Dataset D, training iterations T , trained model fθ
with parameters θ, mask parametersM , batch size n,
PGD iterations K, and PGD step size α for some norm-
ball B.
output Pruned state of network fθ
1: for t = {1, . . . , T} do
2: Sample mini-batch B = {x1, . . . ,xm} ⊂ D
3: for i = {1, . . . , n} do
4: // Run PGD adversary
5: for k = {1, . . . ,K} do
6: x˜k+1i =
∏
B(xi,ε)
(x˜ki +α sgn(OxL(θM , x˜ki ,yi)))
7: end for
8: Optimize θ by Equation 6 andM by Equation 5
using gradient descent.
9: end for
10: end for
following adversarial loss:
min
M
E(x,y)∼D
{
max
δ∈B(x,ε)
L(θ M , x˜,y)
}
(5)
We further combine our proposed pruning scheme with our
novel vulnerability suppression loss (VS) that minimizes the
network vulnerability and further improves the robustness of
the model. Let J(θ M ,x,y) be the adversarial training
loss on a batch of samples (comprised of the cross-entropy
loss on the clean and adversarial samples, plus any weight
decay, etc.). In particular, Adversarial Neural Pruning with
Vulnerability Suppression (ANP-VS) optimizes the network
parameters θ using the following loss:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
{
J(θ M ,x,y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
classification loss
+ λ ·V(fθ(x), fθ(x˜))︸ ︷︷ ︸
vulnerability suppression loss
}
(6)
where λ is the hyper-parameter determining the strength
of the vulnerability suppression loss. The overall training
algorithm is displayed in Algorithm 1.
Intution behind ANP-VS. ANP in Equation (5) encour-
ages the pruning mask to be optimized by minimizing the
adversarial loss and preserving the robustness of the model.
The VS loss encourages the suppression of the distortion of
the latent features in the presence of adversarial perturba-
tions via minimizing the difference between latent-features
of clean examples and those of adversarial examples. We
empirically found that ANP-VS also has an effect of in-
creasing the smoothness of the model’s output and its loss
surface, which is conceptually consistent with the indispens-
able properties of robust models (Cisse et al., 2017; Tsipras
et al., 2019) (see Figure 5).
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Adversarial beta-Bernoulli dropout. Beta-Bernoulli
Dropout (Lee et al., 2018) learns to set the dropout rate
by generating the dropout mask from sparsity-inducing beta-
Bernoulli prior to each neuron. Let θ ∈ RK×L×M be a pa-
rameter tensor of neural network layer with K channels and
M = {m1, . . . ,mn} for any m ∈ {0, 1}K be the binary
mask sampled from the finite-dimensional beta-Bernoulli
prior to be applied for the n-th observation xn.
The goal of the variational inference is to compute the
posterior distribution p(θ,M ,pi|D) and we approximate
this posterior using an approximate variational distribu-
tion q(θ,M ,pi|X˜) of known parametric form. For pi, we
use the Kumaraswamy distribution (Kumaraswamy, 1980)
with parameters a and b following following Lee et al.
(2018); Nalisnick & Smyth (2016), and mk is sampled
by reparametrization with continuous relaxation:
q(pik; ak, bk) = akbkpi
ak−1
k (1− piakk )bk−1
mk = sgm
(
1
τ
(
log
pik
1− pik + log
u
1− u
)) (7)
where sgm(x) = 11+e−x , u ∼ unif[0, 1], and τ is a temper-
ature continuous relaxation. The KL-divergence between
the prior and variational distribution can then be computed
in a closed form (Nalisnick & Smyth, 2016):
DKL[q(M ,pi)‖p(M ,pi)]
=
K∑
k=1
{
ak − α/K
ak
(
− γ − Ψ(bk)− 1
bk
)
+ log
akbk
α/K
− bk − 1
bk
}
(8)
where γ is Euler-Mascheroni constant, and Ψ(.) is digamma
function. Using the Stochastic Gradient Variational Bayes
(SGVB) framework (Kingma et al., 2015), we can optimize
the variational parameters and get the final loss as follows:
min
M
{ N∑
n=1
Eq[log p(yn|f(x˜n;θ M))]
− β ·DKL[q(M ;pi)||p(M |pi)]
} (9)
where β is the trade-off parameter between network ro-
bustness and pruned network size to individually tailor the
degree of compression across each layer of the network.
The first term in the loss measures the log-likelihood of the
adversarial samples w.r.t. q(M ;pi) and the second term
regularizes q(M ;pi) so it doesn’t deviate from the prior dis-
tribution. We refer ANP-VS to Adversarial Beta Bernoulli
dropout with VS for the rest of our paper. We further ex-
tend ANP-VS to the Variational information bottleneck (Dai
et al., 2018) in the supplementary material.
5. Experiments
5.1. Experimental setup
Baselines and our model. We first introduce various
baselines and our model. We compare against following
adversarial robustness and compression baselines:
1. Standard. Base convolution neural network.
2. Bayesian Pruning (BP). Base network with Beta-
Bernoulli dropout (Lee et al., 2018).
3. Adversarial Training (AT). Adversarial trained net-
work (Madry et al., 2018).
4. Adversarial Bayesian Neural Network (AT BNN).
Adversarial Bayesian trained network (Liu et al., 2019).
5. Pre-trained Adversarial Training (Pretrained
AT). Adversarial training on a pre-trained base
model (Hendrycks et al., 2019).
6. Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
(ADMM). Concurrent weight pruning and adversarial
training (Ye & Xu, 2019).
7. Theoretically Principled Trade-off between Robust-
ness and Accuracy (TRADES). Explicit trade off be-
tween natural and robust generalization (Zhang et al.,
2019).
8. Adversarial Neural Pruning with vulnerability sup-
pression (ANP-VS). Adversarial neural pruning regular-
ized with vulnerability suppression loss.
Datasets. We validate our method on following bench-
mark datasets for adversarial robustness:
1. MNIST. This dataset (LeCun, 1998) contains 60,000
grey scale images of handwritten digits sized 28 × 28,
where there are 5,000 training instances and 1,000 test
instances per class. As for the base network, we use
LeNet 5-Caffe 1 for this dataset.
2. CIFAR-10. This dataset (Krizhevsky, 2012) consists
of 60,000 images sized 32 × 32, from ten animal and
vehicle classes. For each class, there are 5,000 images
for training and 1,000 images for test. We use VGG-
16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) for this dataset with
13 convolutional and two fully connected layers with
pre-activation batch normalization and Binary Dropout.
3. CIFAR-100. This dataset (Krizhevsky, 2012) also con-
sists of 60,000 images of 32× 32 pixels as in CIFAR-10
but has 100 generic object classes instead of 10. Each
class has 500 images for training and 100 images for test.
We use VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) similar
to CIFAR-10 dataset as the base network for this dataset.
1https://github.com/BVLC/caffe/tree/master/examples/mnist
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Table 1. Robustness and compression performance for MNIST on Lenet-5-Caffe, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 on VGG-16 architecture
under `∞-PGD attack. All the values are measured by computing mean and standard deviation across 5 trials upon randomly chosen
seeds. The best results over adversarial baselines are highlighted in bold. ↑ (↓) indicates that the higher (lower) number is the better.
Adversarial accuracy (↑) Vulnerability (↓) Computational efficiency
Model Clean
accuracy (↑)
White box
attack
Black box
attack
White box
attack
Black box
attack
Memory (↓) xFLOPS (↑) Sparsity (↑)
M
N
IS
T
Standard 99.29±0.02 0.00±0.0 8.02±0.9 0.129±0.001 0.113±0.000 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
BP 99.34±0.05 0.00±0.0 12.99±0.5 0.091±0.001 0.078±0.001 4.14±0.29 9.68±0.36 83.48±0.54
AT 99.14±0.02 88.03±0.7 94.18±0.8 0.045±0.001 0.040±0.000 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
AT BNN 99.16±0.05 88.44±0.4 94.87±0.2 0.364±0.023 0.199±0.031 200.0±0.00 0.50±0.00 0.00±0.00
Pretrained AT 99.18±0.06 88.26±0.6 94.49±0.7 0.412±0.035 0.381±0.029 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ADMM 99.01±0.02 88.47±0.4 94.61±0.7 0.041±0.002 0.038±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 80.00±0.00
TRADES 99.07±0.04 89.67±0.4 95.04±0.6 0.037±0.001 0.033±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ANP-VS (ours) 99.05±0.08 91.31±0.9 95.43±0.8 0.017±0.001 0.015±0.001 6.81±0.35 10.57±1.15 84.16±0.36
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Standard 92.76±0.1 13.79±0.8 41.65±0.9 0.077±0.001 0.065±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
BP 92.91±0.1 14.30±0.5 42.88±1.3 0.037±0.001 0.033±0.001 12.41±0.14 2.34±0.0.03 75.92±0.13
AT 87.50±0.5 49.85±0.9 63.70±0.6 0.050±0.002 0.047±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
AT BNN 86.69±0.5 51.87±0.9 64.92±0.9 0.267±0.013 0.238±0.011 200.0±0.00 0.50±0.00 0.00±0.00
Pretrained AT 87.50±0.4 52.25±0.7 66.10±0.8 0.041±0.002 0.036±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ADMM 78.15±0.7 47.37±0.6 62.15±0.8 0.034±0.002 0.030±0.002 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 75.00±0.00
TRADES 80.33±0.5 52.08±0.7 64.80±0.5 0.045±0.001 0.042±0.005 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ANP-VS (ours) 88.18±0.5 56.21±0.1 71.44±0.6 0.019±0.000 0.016±0.000 12.27±0.18 2.41±0.04 76.53±0.16
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Standard 67.44±0.7 2.81±0.2 14.94±0.8 0.143±0.007 0.119±0.005 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
BP 69.40±0.7 3.12±0.1 16.39±0.2 0.067±0.001 0.059±0.001 18.59±0.56 1.95±0.04 63.48±0.88
AT 57.79±0.8 19.07±0.8 32.47±1.4 0.079±0.003 0.071±0.003 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
AT BNN 53.75±0.7 19.40±0.6 30.38±0.2 0.446±0.029 0.385±0.051 200.0±0.00 0.50±0.00 0.00±0.00
Pretrained AT 57.14±0.9 19.86±0.6 35.42±0.4 0.071±0.001 0.065±0.002 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ADMM 52.52±0.5 19.65±0.5 31.30±0.3 0.060±0.001 0.056±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 65.00±0.00
TRADES 56.70±0.7 21.21±0.3 32.81±0.6 0.065±0.003 0.060±0.003 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ANP-VS (ours) 59.15±1.2 22.35±0.6 37.01±1.1 0.035±0.001 0.030±0.003 16.74±0.52 2.02±0.05 66.80±0.75
Evaluation setup. We validate our model with three met-
rics for computational efficiency: i) Memory footprint
(Memory) - The ratio of space for storing hidden feature
maps in pruned model versus original model. ii) Float-
ing point operations (xFLOPs) - The ratio of the number
of floating-point operations for the original model versus
pruned model. iii) Model size (Sparsity) - The ratio of the
number of zero units in the original model versus the pruned
model. We report the clean, adversarial accuracy and vul-
nerability (Equation (2)) for `∞ white box and black box
attack (Papernot et al., 2017). For generating black-box
adversarial examples, we used AT and standard network for
adversarial training and standard methods respectively. We
utilize the clean and adversarial examples for adversarial
training methods, all our results are measured by computing
mean and standard deviation across 5 trials with random
seeds. We list the hyper-parameters in the supplementary
material, and the code is available online 2.
2https://github.com/divyam3897/ANP_VS
5.2. Comparison of robustness and generalization
Evaluation on MNIST. For MNIST, we consider a Lenet-
5-Caffe model with a perturbation radius of ε = 0.3, pertur-
bation per step of 0.01, 20 PGD steps for training, and 40
PGD steps with random restarts for evaluating the trained
model. Our pretrained standard Lenet 5-Caffe baseline
model reaches over 99.29% accuracy after 200 epochs av-
eraged across five runs. The results in Table 1 show that
ANP-VS significantly improves the adversarial accuracy and
vulnerability of the network over all the competing base-
lines. Namely, with the robust-features, ANP-VS achieves
∼ 3% improvement in adversarial accuracy and ∼ 65% re-
duction in the vulnerability against white-box and black-box
attacks over the state-of-the-art adversarial training frame-
works. In addition, it achieves ∼ 93% reduction in memory
footprint with significant speedup over standard adversarial
training baselines. The results indicate that ANP-VS better
suppresses the vulnerability of the network, which we can
directly attribute to increased adversarial robustness.
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Table 2. Adversarial accuracy of CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 for VGG-16 architecture under `∞-PGD white box attack for various ε
values and PGD iterations with the perturbation per step of 0.007. The best results are highlighted in bold.
Epsilon (ε) # Iterations
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 100 200 500 1000
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Standard 40.54±0.9 13.79±0.8 4.16±0.5 1.46±0.1 11.76±0.4 11.73±0.7 13.71±0.6 13.68±0.7
BP 41.67±0.6 14.30±0.5 4.21±0.4 1.50±0.1 14.24±0.5 14.18±0.3 14.14±0.2 14.16±0.3
AT 65.86±0.8 49.85±0.9 34.54±0.8 22.69±0.7 49.74±0.9 49.75±0.8 49.76±0.9 49.75±0.9
AT BNN 67.02±0.6 51.87±0.9 36.76±0.9 25.06±0.7 51.81±0.9 51.80±0.9 51.81±0.9 51.80±0.9
Pretrained AT 70.55±0.7 52.25±0.7 37.11±0.8 24.03±0.7 52.19±0.7 52.18±0.7 52.16±0.7 52.13±0.7
ADMM 65.94±0.4 47.37±0.6 32.77±0.6 22.45±0.5 47.34±0.5 47.31±0.5 47.30±0.4 47.31±0.5
TRADES 69.54±0.2 52.08±0.7 34.54±0.3 23.01±0.4 52.03±0.5 52.01±0.6 52.03±0.5 52.02±0.5
ANP-VS (ours) 72.33±0.4 56.21±0.1 40.89±0.3 26.90±0.2 56.17±0.1 56.16±0.1 56.15±0.1 56.16±0.1
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Standard 11.68±0.7 2.81±0.2 0.91±0.1 0.41±0.0 2.77±0.1 2.76±0.2 2.76±0.1 2.75±0.1
BP 13.01±0.3 3.12±0.1 1.04±0.1 0.47±0.0 3.02±0.3 3.06±0.2 3.03±0.2 3.04±0.1
AT 35.10±0.9 19.07±0.8 10.62±0.4 5.89±0.8 19.06±0.8 19.03±0.8 19.02±0.8 19.04±0.7
AT BNN 30.13±0.9 19.40±0.6 10.79±0.5 5.99±0.2 19.34±0.9 19.37±0.9 19.36±0.9 19.35±0.8
Pretrained AT 33.92±0.2 19.86±0.6 11.39±0.3 6.27±0.1 19.85±0.5 19.84±0.6 19.81±0.6 19.83±0.6
ADMM 34.59±0.2 19.65±0.5 10.50±0.3 4.77±0.4 19.60±0.3 19.57±0.3 19.59±0.3 19.59±0.2
TRADES 33.89±0.1 21.22±0.3 10.80±0.1 4.51±0.2 21.15±0.4 21.16±0.3 21.20±0.4 21.15±0.4
ANP-VS (ours) 35.70±0.8 22.35±0.6 12.95±0.6 7.28±0.3 22.32±0.7 22.26±0.7 22.25±0.6 22.26±0.7
Evaluation on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. In order to
show that ANP-VS is capable of scaling to more complex
datasets, we evaluate our method on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 dataset with VGG-16 architecture. We use ε = 0.03,
10 PGD steps for training and 40 steps with random restart
for evaluation. The results are summarized in Table 1. We
make the following observations from the results: (1) ANP-
VS achieves ∼ 7% improvement in adversarial accuracy,
∼ 58% reduction in vulnerability of the network against
white-box and black-box attack over all the baselines for
both the datasets. (2) Our proposed method is not only ef-
fective on adversarial robustness but also outperforms all
the compared adversarial baselines on the standard gener-
alization performance, and strongly support our hypothesis
of obtaining robust features. (3) Compared to the standard
adversarial training baselines, our method shows a reduc-
tion∼ 85% in the memory-footprint with 2× fewer FLOPS,
demonstrating the effectiveness of our method.
One might also be concerned regarding the number of PGD
steps and different ε values as for certain defenses; the
robustness decreased as the number of PGD steps were in-
creased (Engstrom et al., 2018). Table 2 shows the results
for different `∞ epsilon values and PGD steps up to 1000.
Remarkably, in both scenarios, our proposed defense outper-
forms all the compared baselines, illustrating the practicality
of our method. These results indicate that even if the at-
tacker uses greater resources to attack, the effect on our
proposed method is negligible. This allows us to conclude
that ANP-VS can induce reliable and effective adversarial
robustness with much less computation cost.
5.3. Ablation studies
Analysis of individual components. To further gain in-
sights into the performance of ANP-VS, we perform abla-
tion studies to dissect the effectiveness of various compo-
nents (ANP and VS) for robustness in Table 3. First, we
study the impact of VS loss on AT, whether VS produces bet-
ter robustness, and curtails the vulnerability of the network.
One can observe that AT-VS improves the adversarial accu-
racy (∼ 3%) and leads to ∼ 50% reduction in vulnerability
over AT for MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset. In addition,
note that the clean accuracy for AT-VS is approximately the
same as AT across all the datasets, which indicates that VS
may have a limited effect on standard accuracy, but has a
substantial impact on robustness.
Second, we investigate the impact of ANP on AT, whether
pruning the vulnerable latent-features is more effective
than merely suppressing the vulnerability of those features.
Table 3 shows that ANP not only improves the robust-
ness (∼ 10%) but also the standard generalization (∼ 3%)
over AT. Furthermore, we can observe that ANP on AT sig-
nificantly outperforms VS on AT with CIFAR-10 dataset
by ∼ 4% on the adversarial accuracy while significantly
reducing the computational cost. This observation supports
our conjecture that ANP incorporates the vulnerability of
latent-features, and pruning the vulnerable latent-features
improves robustness. We know from these results that using
VS or ANP can already outperform AT, while incorporating
them together in ANP-VS additionally further boosts the
performance, as testified.
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Figure 3. Comparison of clean and adversarial accuracy for different
sparsity levels. Top: VGG-16 on CIFAR10. Bottom: VGG-16 on
CIFAR100 dataset.
Table 3. Ablation studies for Vulnerability Suppression loss (VS)
and Adversarial Neural Pruning (ANP) to investigate the impact
of VS and ANP against `∞ white-box PGD attack. ↑ (↓) indicates
that the higher (lower) number is the better. The best results are
highlighted in bold.
Model Clean Acc. (↑) Adv. acc (↑) Vulnerability (↓)
M
N
IS
T
AT 99.14±0.02 88.03±0.7 0.045±0.001
AT-VS 99.24±0.05 90.36±0.8 0.022±0.001
ANP 98.64±0.07 90.12±0.5 0.020±0.002
ANP-VS 99.05±0.08 91.31±0.9 0.011±0.002
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 AT 87.50±0.5 49.85±0.9 0.050±0.002
AT-VS 87.44±0.5 51.52±0.4 0.024±0.002
ANP 88.36±0.4 55.63±0.9 0.022±0.001
ANP-VS 88.18±0.5 56.21±0.1 0.016±0.000
C
IF
A
R
-1
00 AT 57.79±0.8 19.07±0.8 0.079±0.003
AT-VS 57.74±0.6 20.06±0.9 0.061±0.005
ANP 58.47±1.02 22.20±1.1 0.037±0.003
ANP-VS 59.15±1.2 22.35±0.6 0.035±0.001
Robustness and sparsity. Our proposed method could
be vital when we want to obtain a lightweight yet robust
network. To show that we can achieve both goals at once, we
experiment with different scaling coefficient for the KL term
in Equation (9) to obtain architectures with varying degrees
of sparsity, whose details can be found in the supplementary
material.
Figure 3 clearly shows that ANP-VS outperforms AT up to a
sparsity level of∼ 80% for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 after
which there is a decrease in the robust and standard gener-
alization. The results are not surprising, as it is an overall
outcome of the model capacity reduction and the removal
of the robust features. We further analyze a baseline PAT
where we first perform Bayesian pruning, freeze the dropout
mask, and then perform AT (see Figure 3). We can observe
that PAT marginally improves the robustness over AT but
loses on clean accuracy. Note that ANP-VS significantly
outperforms PAT, supporting our hypothesis that just naive
approach of AT over pruning can hurt performance.
5.4. Further analysis on defense performance
Vulnerability analysis. We conduct additional experi-
ments to visualize the vulnerability of the latent-feature
space to investigate the robust and vulnerable features. Fig-
ure 4 (Top) compares the vulnerability of various models.
One can observe that the latent-features of the standard
model are the most vulnerable, and the vulnerability de-
creases with the AT and is further suppressed by half with
ANP-VS. Further, note that the latent features of our pro-
posed method capture more local information of the objects
and align much better with human perception.
In addition, Figure 4 (Bottom) shows the histogram of the
vulnerability of latent-features for input-layer defined in
Equation (1) for various methods. We consistently see that
standard Bayesian pruning zeros out some of the distortions
in the latent-features, and AT reduces the distortion level
of all the latent-features. On the other hand, ANP-VS does
both, with the largest number of latent-features with zero
distortion and low distortion level in general. In this vein, we
can say that ANP-VS demonstrates the effectiveness of our
method as a defense mechanism by obtaining robust features
utilizing pruning and latent vulnerability suppression.
Loss landscape visualization. It has been observed that
adversarial training flatters the adversarial loss landscape
and obfuscated gradients can often lead to bumpier loss land-
scapes (Engstrom et al., 2018). To investigate this problem
of obfuscated gradients, we visualize the adversarial loss
landscape of the baseline models and ANP-VS in Figure 5.
We vary the input along a linear space defined by the sign
of gradient where x and y-axes represent the perturbation
added in each direction, and the z-axis represents the loss.
We can observe that the loss is highly curved in the vicinity
of the data point x for the standard networks, which reflects
that the gradient poorly models the global landscape. On
the other hand, we observe that both sparsity and adversar-
ial training make the loss surface smooth, with our model
obtaining the smoothest surface. It demonstrates that our
proposed method is not susceptible to the problem of gradi-
ents obfuscation. In addition, it indicates that suppressing
the network vulnerability leads to robust optimization, un-
covering some unexpected benefits of our proposed method
over adversarial training.
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Standard Bayesian pruning Adversarial training Proposed method
Figure 4. Top: Visualization of the vulnerability of the latent-features with respect to the input pixels for various set of datasets. Bottom:
Histogram of vulnerability of the features for the input layer for CIFAR-10 with the number of zeros shown in orange color.
Standard Bayesian pruning Adversarial training Proposed method
Figure 5. Comparison of loss landscapes for various methods. We observe that our proposed method results in a much smoother and
flattened loss surface compared to adversarial training. The z axis represents the loss projected along two random directions.
6. Conclusion
We hypothesized that the adversarial vulnerability of deep
neural networks comes from the distortion in the latent fea-
ture space since if they are suppressed at any layers of the
deep network, they will not affect the prediction. Based
on this hypothesis, we formally defined the vulnerability
of a latent feature and proposed Adversarial Neural Prun-
ing(ANP) as a defense mechanism to achieve adversarial
robustness as well as a means of achieving a memory- and
computation-efficient deep neural networks. Specifically,
we proposed a Bayesian formulation that trains a Bayesian
pruning (dropout) mask for adversarial robustness of the
network. Then we introduced Vulnerabiltiy Suppression
(VS) loss, that minimizes network vulnerability. To this end,
we proposed Adversarial Neural Pruning with Vulnerability
Suppression (ANP-VS), which prunes the vulnerable fea-
tures by learning pruning masks for them, to minimize the
adversarial loss and feature-level vulnerability. We experi-
mentally validate ANP-VS on three datasets against recent
baselines, and the results show that it significantly improves
the robustness of the deep network, achieving state-of-the-
art results on all the datasets. Further qualitative analysis
shows that our method obtains more interpretable latent
features compared to standard counterparts, effectively sup-
presses feature-level distortions, and obtains smoother loss
surface. We hope that our work leads to more follow-up
works on adversarial learning that investigates the distortion
in the latent feature space, which we believe is a more direct
cause of adversarial vulnerability.
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A. Adversarial variational information
bottleneck
In this section, we extend the idea of Adversarial Neural
Pruning to Variational Information Bottleneck (VIB). Varia-
tional information bottleneck (Dai et al., 2018) uses infor-
mation theoretic bound to reduce the redundancy between
adjacent layers. Let p(hi|hi−) define the conditional prob-
ability and I(hi;hi−) define the mutual information be-
tween hidden layer activationshi andhi− for every hidden
layer in the network. For every hidden layer hi, we would
like to minimize the information bottleneck (Tishby et al.,
2000) I(hi;hi−) to remove interlayer redundancy, while
simultaneously maximizing the mutual information I(hi;y)
between hi and the output y to encourage accurate predic-
tions of adversarial examples. The layer-wise energy Li can
be written as:
Li = βiI(hi;hi−)− I(hi;y) (10)
The output layer approximates the true distribution p(y|hL)
via some tractable alternative q(y|hL). Using variational
bounds, we can invoke the upper bound as:
Li = βiEhi−∼p(hi−)[DKL[p(hi|hi−)||q(hi)]]−
E{x,y}∼D,h∼p(h|x˜)[log q(y|hL)] ≥ Li
(11)
Li in Equation 11 is composed of two terms, the first is
the KL divergence between p(hi|hi−) and q(hi), which
approximates information extracted by hi from hi− and
the second term represents constancy with respect to the
adversarial data distribution. In order to optimize Equa-
tion 11, we can define the parametric form for the distribu-
tions p(hi|hi−) and q(hi) as follow:
p(hi|hi−) = N (hi; fi(hi−) µi,diag[fi(hi−)2  σ2i ]
q(hi) = N (hi; 0,diag[ξi])
(12)
where ξi is an unknown vector of variances that can be
learned from data. The gaussian assumptions help us to
get an interpretable, closed-form approximation for the KL
term from Equation 11, which allows us to directly optimize
ξi out of the model.
Ehi−∼p(hi−)[DKL[p(hi|hi−)||q(hi)]] =∑
j
[
log
(
1 +
µ2i,j
σ2i,j
)]
(13)
The final variational information bottleneck can thus be
obtained using Equation 13:
L =
L∑
i=1
βi
ri∑
j=1
[
log
(
1 +
µ2i,j
σ2i,j
)]
−
E{x,y}∼D,h∼p(h|x˜)[log q(y|hL)]
(14)
where β ≥ 0 is a coefficient that determines the strength of
the bottleneck that can be defined as the degree to which we
value compression over robustness.
B. Experiment setup
In this section, we describe our experimental settings for
all the experiments. We follow the two-step pruning proce-
dure where we pretrain all the networks using the standard-
training procedure followed by network sparsification using
various sparsification methods. We train each model with
200 epochs with a fixed batch size of 64. All the results are
measured by computing mean and standard deviation across
5 trials upon randomly chosen seeds.
Our pretrained standard Lenet 5-Caffe baseline model
reaches over 99.29% accuracy on MNIST and VGG-16
architecture reaches 92.76% and 67.44% on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 dataset respectively after 200 epochs. We use
Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with the learning rate for the
weights to be 0.1 times smaller than those for the variational
parameters as in (Neklyudov et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2018).
For Beta-Bernoulli Dropout, we set α/K = 10−4 for all the
layers and prune the neurons/filters whose expected drop
probability are smaller than a fixed threshold 10−3 as orig-
inally proposed in the paper. For Beta-Bernoulli Dropout,
we scaled the KL-term by different values of trade-off pa-
rameter β where β ∈ {1, 4, 8, 10, 12} for Lenet-5-Caffe and
β ∈ {1, 2, 4, 6, 8} for VGG-16. For Variational Informa-
tion Bottleneck (VIBNet), we tested with trade-off param-
eter β in Equation 14 where β ∈ {10, 30, 50, 80, 100} for
Lenet-5-Caffe with MNIST and β ∈ {10−4, 1, 20, 40, 60}
for VGG-16 with CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 dataset. For
generating black-box adversarial examples, we used an ad-
versarial trained full network for adversarial neural pruning
and the standard base network for the standard Bayesian
compression method.
C. More experimental results
Due to the length limit of our paper, some results are illus-
trated here.
C.1. Robustness of adversarial variational information
bottleneck
The results for ANP-VS with Variational Information Bot-
tleneck are summarized in Table 4. We can observe that
ANP-VS with Variational Information Bottleneck signifi-
cantly outperforms the base adversarial training for robust-
ness of adversarial examples by achieving an improvement
of ∼ 2% in adversarial accuracy. Note that, ANP-VS leads
to ∼ 50% and ∼ 25% reduction in vulnerability for CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 dataset with memory and computation
efficiency. We emphasize that ANP can similarly be ex-
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Table 4. Robustness and compression performance for MNIST on Lenet-5-Caffe, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 on VGG-16 architecture
under `∞-PGD attack for ANP-VS with Variational Information Bottleneck. All the values are measured by computing mean and standard
deviation across 5 trials upon randomly chosen seeds. The best results over adversarial baselines are highlighted in bold.
Adversarial accuracy (↑) Vulnerability (↓) Computational efficiency
Model Clean
accuracy (↑)
White box
attack
Black box
attack
White box
attack
Black box
attack
Memory (↓) xFLOPS (↑) Sparsity (↑)
M
N
IS
T
Standard 99.29±0.02 0.00±0.0 8.02±0.9 0.129±0.001 0.113±0.000 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
BP 99.32±0.04 5.66±0.4 15.47±0.3 0.091±0.001 0.078±0.001 4.34±0.34 9.39±0.25 82.46±0.61
AT 99.14±0.02 88.03±0.7 94.18±0.8 0.045±0.001 0.040±0.000 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
AT BNN 99.16±0.05 88.44±0.4 94.87±0.2 0.364±0.023 0.199±0.031 200.0±0.00 0.50±0.00 0.00±0.00
Pretrained AT 99.18±0.06 88.26±0.6 94.49±0.7 0.412±0.035 0.381±0.029 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ADMM 99.01±0.02 88.47±0.4 94.61±0.7 0.041±0.002 0.038±0.001 100.00±0.00 1.00±0.00 80.00±0.00
TRADES 99.07±0.04 89.67±0.4 95.04±0.6 0.037±0.001 0.033±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ANP-VS (ours) 98.86±0.02 90.11±0.9 95.14±0.8 0.017±0.001 0.015±0.001 4.87±0.21 10.06±0.87 78.48±0.42
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Standard 92.76±0.1 13.79±0.8 41.65±0.9 0.077±0.001 0.065±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
BP 92.73±0.1 12.28±0.3 76.35±0.8 0.035±0.002 0.032±0.001 12.38±0.12 2.38±0.0.05 76.35±0.23
AT 87.50±0.5 49.85±0.9 63.70±0.6 0.050±0.002 0.047±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
AT BNN 86.69±0.5 51.87±0.9 64.92±0.9 0.267±0.013 0.238±0.011 200.0±0.00 0.50±0.00 0.00±0.00
Pretrained AT 87.50±0.4 52.25±0.7 66.10±0.8 0.041±0.002 0.036±0.001 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ADMM 78.15±0.7 47.37±0.6 62.15±0.8 0.034±0.002 0.030±0.002 100.00±0.00 1.00±0.00 75.00±0.00
TRADES 80.33±0.5 52.08±0.7 64.80±0.5 0.045±0.001 0.042±0.005 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ANP-VS (ours) 87.56±0.2 53.41±0.5 68.12±0.7 0.025±0.002 0.021±0.001 12.09±0.26 2.43±0.02 77.02±0.32
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Standard 67.44±0.7 2.81±0.2 14.94±0.8 0.143±0.007 0.119±0.005 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
BP 69.09±0.5 2.73±0.3 19.53±0.4 0.084±0.001 0.073±0.001 18.46±0.42 1.95±0.03 63.84±0.62
AT 57.79±0.8 19.07±0.8 32.47±1.4 0.079±0.003 0.071±0.003 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
AT BNN 53.75±0.7 19.40±0.6 30.38±0.2 0.446±0.029 0.385±0.051 200.0±0.00 0.50±0.00 0.00±0.00
Pretrained AT 57.14±0.9 19.86±0.6 35.42±0.4 0.071±0.001 0.065±0.002 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ADMM 52.52±0.5 19.65±0.5 31.30±0.3 0.060±0.001 0.056±0.001 100.00±0.00 1.00±0.00 65.00±0.00
TRADES 56.70±0.7 21.21±0.3 32.81±0.6 0.065±0.003 0.060±0.003 100.0±0.00 1.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
ANP-VS (ours) 59.77±0.4 21.53±0.6 36.82±0.7 0.048±0.002 0.042±0.002 16.46±0.34 2.06±0.02 67.19±0.57
tended to any existing or future sparsification method to
improve performance. Table 5 further shows the number of
units for the baselines and our proposed method.
C.2. Features vulnerability
Figure 6 shows the histogram of the feature vulnerability
for various datasets. We consistently observe that standard
Bayesian pruning zeros out some of the distortions, AT
reduces the distortion level of all the features and ANP-VS
does both, with the most significant number of features with
zero distortion and low distortion level in general which
confirms that our proposed method works successfully as a
defense against adversarial attacks. All these results overall
confirm the effectiveness of our defense.
C.3. Features visualization
One might also be curious about the representation of the
robust and vulnerable features in the latent-feature space.
We visualize the robust and vulnerable features based on the
vulnerability of a feature in the latent-feature space from
our paper. Figure 7 shows the visualization of robust and
vulnerable features in the latent space for adversarial train-
ing. Note that, AT contains features with high vulnerability
(vulnerable feature) and features with less vulnerability (ro-
bust feature), which aligns with our observation that the
latent features have a varying degree of susceptibility to
adversarial perturbations to the input. As future work, we
plan to explore more effective ways to suppress perturbation
at the intermediate latent features of deep networks.
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Model No of neurons
M
N
IS
T
Standard 20 – 50 – 800 – 500
BP (BBD) 14 – 21 – 150 – 49
BP (VIB) 12 – 19 – 160 – 37
AT 20 – 50 – 800 – 500
ANP-VS (BBD) 7 – 21 – 147 – 46
ANP-VS (VIB) 10 – 23 – 200 – 53
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Standard 64 – 64 – 128 – 128 – 256 – 256 – 256 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512
BP (BBD) 57 – 59 – 127 – 101 – 150 – 71 – 31 – 41 – 35 – 10 – 46 – 48 – 16 – 16 – 25
BP (VIB) 49 – 56 – 106 – 92 – 157 – 74 – 26 – 43 – 32 – 10 – 39 – 40 – 7 – 7 – 13
AT 64 – 64 – 128 – 128 – 256 – 256 – 256 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512
ANP-VS (BBD) 42 – 57 – 113 – 96 – 147 – 68 – 25 – 37 – 27 – 9 – 39 – 40 – 13 – 13 – 12
ANP-VS (VIB) 40 – 57 – 104 – 93 – 174 – 96 – 30 – 48 – 39 – 9 – 49 – 57 – 10 – 10 – 12
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Standard 64 – 64 – 128 – 128 – 256 – 256 – 256 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512
BP (BBD) 62 – 64 – 128 – 123 – 244 – 203 – 84 – 130 – 95 – 18 – 152 – 157 – 32 – 32 – 101
BP (VIB) 52 – 64 – 119 – 116 – 229 – 179 – 83 – 99 – 71 – 17 – 107 – 110 – 12 – 11 – 49
AT 64 – 64 – 128 – 128 – 256 – 256 – 256 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512 – 512
ANP-VS (BBD) 60 – 64 – 126 – 122 – 235 – 185 – 77 – 128 – 101 – 17 – 165 – 177 – 35 – 35 – 45
ANP-VS (VIB) 44 – 58 – 110 – 109 – 207 – 155 – 81 – 86 – 66 – 19 – 88 – 86 – 15 – 15 – 36
Table 5. Distribution of neurons for all the layers of Lenet-5 Caffe for MNIST and VGG-16 architecture for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
(i) (j) (k) (l)
Figure 6. Histogram of vulnerability of the features for the input layer for MNIST in the top row, CIFAR-10 in the middle and CIFAR-100
in the bottom with the number of zeros shown in orange color.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Figure 7. Visualization of convolutional features of first layer of adversarial trained VGG-16 network with CIFAR-100 dataset. b) - d)
represents the vulnerable latent-feature with high vulnerability (vulnerable feature) on b) clean example, c) Adversarial example d)
Vulnerability (difference between clean and adversarial example) e) - f) represents the vulnerable latent-feature with low vulnerability
(robust feature) on e) clean example, f) Adversarial example g) Vulnerability (difference between clean and adversarial example)
